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Abstract
This paper examines the evolution of labor earnings inequality in an environment where
individuals learn about their own ability (productivity) from wage realizations and decide
their eort levels. It is shown that innate ability heterogeneity and idiosyncratic income
shock variance have distinct eects on emergence patterns of earnings inequality. Struc-
tural parameters are estimated using data from Japan and the United States. It is found
that wage is more directly linked with individual ability in the United States than Japan.
The weak linkage of wage to individual ability in Japan slows down the speed by which
agents learn about ability, and makes the evolution of both cross-agent eort and earnings
variability later in lifetime in the country.
JEL Classication Codes: J2, J3, D3, D8
Key Words: Labor Earnings Inequality, Learning, Ability Heterogeneity, Income
Shocks, Japan, the United States
1 Introduction
The evolution of earnings inequality has long been in the center of research agenda
for economics profession as well as policy makers.
1
Labor earnings, of the largest share
among dierent categories of income sources, show various patterns of inequality emer-
gence across countries (e.g. Deaton and Paxson, 1994; Ohtake and Saito, 1998; etc.).
However, the way to interpret the observed inequality of labor earnings, from which to
design an justiable redistribution scheme, depends on what proportion of the variations
is attributed to innate ability heterogeneity and to stochastic nature of life, i.e. luck. If
most of earnings inequality is attributed to ability heterogeneity, it can be understood that
the inequality is cross-agent productivity dierentials revealed in labor markets, but pre-
determined prior to the entry to labor force. On the other hand, if luck plays a major role
in the determination of inequality, it is ex post consequences of stochastic income process.
The aim of this paper is to empirically identify, using cross-agent earnings variability by
various ages computed from Japanese and U.S. data, the eects of ability heterogeneity
and of income risks on the pattern in which labor earnings inequality emerges as people
age.
Ability heterogeneity determines the time-invariant variations of earnings, while in-
come shocks determine the time-varying variations. In a perfect-information stationary
world, therefore, their proportion should not aect on average the earnings inequality.
However, once ability is ex ante unknown and agents optimize their eorts sequentially,
this proposition does not hold. In a theoretical framework, I set up a model in which
individual workers dynamically learn about their abilities (productivity) on their job and
decide their eort levels sequentially. Through the learning behavior and sequential eort
decisions, it is found that ability heterogeneity and income-shock variance have distinct
and identiable eects on the evolutionary pattern of within-cohort labor earnings inequal-
ity; ability heterogeneity makes the inequality emergence earlier in career while income
1
Levy and Murane (1992) surveys issues of earnings inequality in the U.S., and Gottschalk and Smeed-
ing (1997) provide an extended survey on cross-country comparisons of earnings and income inequality.
Gottschalk and Joyce (1998) provide a comprehensive analysis of rises in earnings inquality in OECD
countries and explain the changes from market and institutional factors. Murphy and Welch (1992), Katz
and Murphy (1992), and Juhn, Murphy and Piece (1993) examine the sources for the widely docum-
mented increase in wage inequality in the 1980s U.S. Most of the empirical studies on earnings (income)
distribution focus on the causes for rises in the inequality observed in U.S., U.K., and other developed
countries.
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shocks make the emergence later in career. Using this asymmetry in their eects, it is
possible to explain dierent patterns of inequality emergence actually observed in dierent
societies and cohorts.
Although employer's learning about workers' abilities and their wage-setting behavior
have been examined in the literature (Farber and Gibbons, 1996; Gibbons and Murphy,
1992; etc.), the role of individual ability-learning and sequential eort decisions in de-
termining earnings inequality has not been addressed and tested. Whether employers or
workers learn about workers' abilities, however, one common implication would be that
the correlation between ability and earnings is increasing as people age. Farber and Gib-
bons (1996) nd that time-invariant variables, correlated with unobserved ability, become
more strongly correlated to wages as workers experience. In their arguments, it is be-
cause employers learn about employees' abilities over time and adjust wage rates. From
a dierent perspective, Behrman, Hrubec, Taubmen and Wales (1980) using a sample of
twin-individuals nd that the earnings correlation between twins is about 0.56 for white
male veterans of about age 50. Since the estimated correlation has not been adjusted
for dierences in environments with which the twin individuals are provided, it should
be regarded as the lower bound of the contribution of ability to earnings variance. The
contribution of ability to earnings increases as people age.
Another nding in the literature is that dierent economies have dierent proportions
of permanent and transitory components in labor earnings. As for the attempt to de-
compose permanent and transitory components of earnings, Blundell and Preston (1998)
examine the composition of permanent and transitory components in household income
shocks in the U.K., and conclude that an increase in transitory income shock variance
contributed to a rise in the consumption inequality in the 1980s.
2
For Germany and
the U.S., Burkhauser, Holtz-Eakin and Rhody (1997) show that individual-specic xed
components mainly contribute to the inequality of labor earnings in the U.S., while per-
sistence of income shocks contributes to labor earnings inequality in Germany. For the
U.S., Geweke and Keane (1997) show that about 60 to 70 percent of the variations of
the log of earnings is accounted for by transitory income shocks and that about 60 per-
cent of the variation of lifetime earnings is attributed to unobserved permanent individual
characteristics uncorrelated with race, age and education.
3
The implications of this paper are consistent with the above two facts. The behavior of
2
They use consumption as a measure of inequality as it measures permanent component of income more
precisely than income does. Note also that in their benchmark framework, all the shocks (permanent and
transitory) are idiosyncratic. They show that the introduction of correlated shocks to households within
a cohort does not change the identication problem of permanent and transitory components.
3
In a related paper using the same data set, Gottschalk and MoÆt (1993) found that, within age-
education groups, earnings variations due to dierences in permanent component are much larger than
that attributed to transitory shock component.
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labor earnings inequality emergence depends on the extent to which wage signals contain
noise (transitory wage shocks). In an environment where wage signals contain relatively
large amount of noise, agents could at best learn their ability slowly. Thus the cross-agent
eort (and earnings) variations emerge in late career. If ability heterogeneity is relatively
large, the sensitivity of eort decision to wage signal realizations rises because workers
learn their ability from current wage realizations and are willing to adjust their eort
levels based on their updated perceptions. This results in an early emergence of earnings
inequality.
4
Therefore, dierent proportion of permanent and transitory components of
earnings now determines evolutionary patterns of earnings inequality. In addition to this
outcome, since workers learn their ability over time, earnings becomes correlated to ability
more strongly as workers age.
But, can we observe dierent patterns of earnings inequality emergence? For example,
can we observe dierent timing of within-cohort inequality emergence in Japan and the
U.S.? Although it is perceived that the inequality emerges in relatively early career in the
U.S. and it emerges in later career in Japan, empirical examinations have been provided
only recently. In a seminal paper by Deaton and Paxson (1994), within-cohort earnings
and consumption inequality increase with age in Taiwan, U.S., and U.K., but patterns
of earnings (not necessarily consumption) inequality emergence are dierent across the
three countries. For example, earnings inequality emerges intensively around age of 50
in Taiwan, but it emerges earlier in the U.S. The pattern for Japan looks more like
Taiwan or U.K. cases
5
(Iwamoto, 1999; Ohtake and Saito, 1998). To motivate us on this
issue, Section 2 illustrates dierent emerging patterns of within-cohort earnings inequality
observed in the U.S. and Japan.
Section 3 sets up a model, and characterizes intertemporal changes in eort and labor-
earnings inequality. Section 4 provides some estimation results from Japan and the U.S.
and shows a contrasting nature of the two economies. Concluding remarks are following
in the nal section.
4
In similar spirit, Prendargast and Stole (1996) examine the role of individual-specic noise variance
(dened as ability in their paper, also private information) in investment behavior. In their context,
therefore, the sensitivity of investment decisions to signals reveals the individual-specic noise variance,
which contributes to the formation of market-wide reputation agents concern. Similarly in this paper,
the time-varying responsiveness of individual eort decisions to wage realizations in micro levels plays an
important role in determining the timing and size of the emergence of earnings inequality in aggregate
level.
5
Cohort-specic varinaces of household income in U.K. are computed by Blundell and Preston (1998,
table 1) using the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) 1968-1992. Ten-year bands for age of birth of house-
hold head are used for dening cohorts. Income inequality for the cohorts in the1920s, 1930s, 1940s, and
1950s.take similar convex shapes. Particularly, income variances of the 1930s and 1940s cohorts rise in
late career. Deaton and Paxson (1994) use the same data and derive similar curvatures of age-earnings
inequality relationship for the country.
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2 Some Evidence from Japan and the US
This section shows observed evolutionary patterns of earnings or income inequality
in Japan and the U.S. Dierent economies share a common phenomenon that earnings
inequality increases as people age, but convexity (or concavity) of the shapes is dierent
across countries.
For U.S., Farber and Gibbons (1996, their table 1) computed standard deviations of
wages for each experience group for relatively young workers, using the National Longitu-
dinal Survey of Youth (NLSY)1979-1988. Those who were the ages of 14 to 21 on January
1, 1979 are in the sample. Figure 1 shows the experience path of wage variance. It is
found that the wage variance rises as years of experience increase, but the rate of increase
is the highest in the onset of their career and decreases as workers experience. Contrary to
the ndings for the U.K., the path of wage inequality exhibits a concave shape in the U.S.
Deaton and Paxson (1994, gure 6) using the Consumer Expenditure Survey 1980-1990
show that age eect on the variance of log earnings exhibits a concave shape particularly
in the ages of 20-50, consistent with Figure 1 (in early career up to at most 11 years of
experience).
6
I estimated the variances of log transformed labor earnings
7
using the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics, 1990-1997, and estimated the age eects following Deaton and Paxson
(1994) method. Figure 2 shows the estimated age eects for age 25-55. The earnings
6
Geweke and Keane (1997) in their study using PSID provide some interpretable evidence on age-
varying magnitudes of income risks, and of education eect. First, disturbance variance in income deter-
mination is large when young and it is decreasing as people age. In other words, stochastic mobility is
large when young, not when old. Disturbance variances for young men in one version of model are 0.614
(age 25), 0.455 (age 30), 0.442 (age 45), and 0.442 (age 60), and those in another version are 0.599 (age
25), 0.473 (age 30), 0.445 (age 45), and 0.445 (age 60). Second, education eects also vary by ages. The
marginal eects on earnings of 16 year education relative to 12 year education for young men in the rst
version are 0.195 (age 25), 0.341 (age 35), 0.374 (age 45), and 0.284 (age 55), and those in the second
are 0.173 (age 25), 0.450 (age 35), 0.389 (age 45), and 0.400 (age 55). The rst eect works for widening
earnings inequality in relatively early career, but the second eect contributes to widening the inequality
in late career.
7
For the self-employed, labor earnings include income from their assets. Therefore, it is possible to
take a negative value. The observations of negative value are dropped from the sample. The age groups of
age less than 24 and more than 56 were not used in the estimation because the sample siges are too small
and possibly cause biases in the variance estimates. Compared with Deaton and Paxson (1994) estimates
for the U.S., my variance estimates for the ages more than 56 certainly show excessively large numbers.
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inequality rises in the 20-30s and it increases linearly thereafter, which is consistent with
the ndings in Farber and Gibbons (1996).
For Japan, though data source is limited in the country, Wage Structure Survey 1961
and 1976 can be used for a comparison of within-cohort inequality of earnings between
the two years. Atoda and Tachibanaki (1991), using this data, compute variances of log
earnings in dierent birth cohorts sorted by educational attainment. Strikingly, the in-
equality had decreased as workers age in that period for all the cohorts they investigate.
8
However, more recently, Ohtake and Saito (1998, gures 3-2 and 4-1) use the National
Survey on Family Income and Expenditure 1979, 1984, and 1989 and show a more com-
prehensive picture of within-cohort log-income variance dynamics, in which age eect on
income variance is found to be positive and convex. Iwamoto (1999), on the other hand,
also decomposed the variance of log income into age and cohort eects, using merged
large-sample cross-sectional household data from 1989 to 1995 (Comprehensive Survey of
Living Condition of the People on Health and Wealth). Figure 3 shows the estimated age
eects from the Iwamoto estimates of log income variances (Iwamoto, 1999). An increas-
ing and convex age-curve is depicted for the age 25-55. From the last two studies, the
income (earnings) inequality of Japanese households is smaller than those for the U.S. and
U.K., and it emerges slower
9
. For the case of Taiwan, Deaton and Paxson (1993, gure 6)
use the Personal Income Distribution Surveys 1976-1990 and nd that earnings variance
is convex in age. The pattern is similar to the case of Japan, but the inequality emerges
more intensively around the age of 50.
The observations from these countries motivate us to formulate a basic framework
for understanding the mechanism for generating dierent patterns of earnings inequality
emergence. The model in the next section provides some interpretations for a variety
of patterns in which earnings inequality emerges as workers age. In the core of our
motivations is to answer why dierent societies and dierent cohorts exhibit dierent
patterns of earnings-inequality emergence.
8
This observation is the only one which shows a negative age eect on earnings inequality. Compared
to other studies about Japan and other OECD countries, I conclude that the generality of this nding is
questionable.
9
For Germany, I estimated the variance of log earnings from the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP)1984-1989 (before the German unication). The cohort eects of 10 year band are controlled
for. The interesting nding for Germany is that earnings inequality rises intensively in the age 35-45. It
increases in a convex way before the age of 40 and in a concave way after the age. In this sense, it is a
hybrid type of Japan and the U.S. Dierent from the countries previously surveyed, the case of Germany
alarms that, to begin with our investigation, it is important to recognize heterogeneities across countries




Individual i in a cohort (or simply agent i), uniformly distributed over [0; 1], decides
his/her eort level e
i
t
before observing wage rate w
i
t
in each time. Production shocks
aect the marginal productivity of labor. Wage rate w
i
t
is a sum of individual ability
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) diers apparently across labor market institutions. Utility function is assumed to be


































It is assumed here that wage rate is a linear function of individual ability, not of teams. A rather
simple production technology such as this is assumed so that the other workers' abilities do not aect
his/her marginal productivity.
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. Now, agents set


























































implies that the mean of wage does not change over time. I abstract human-capital
accumulation from this model, simply because the focus of this paper is placed on the evolution of earnings
inequality, not on age-prole of mean wage or earnings. However, by assuming arbitrary low value of initial
ability estimate (therefore, of initial eort level), it is possible to incorporate an increasing age-prole of
mean earnings, but not mean wage, in this model
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Some reservations on the form of our wage equation follow. First, for simplicity,
years of schooling, experience, on-the-job training, and other determinants of individual
productivity are normalized to be zero.
14
Second, returns on ability is normalized to be








. In general, the value of q
(market price of ability or skill) depends on demands for abilities and varies over time.
The production in this section has a simplied structure in that individual marginal
productivity depends only on his or her own ability plus an idiosyncratic shock. It is also
important to recognize that dierent labor-market institutions have dierent functioning
for determining q. The framework also does not exclude a possibility that q diers across
countries, i.e. magnitudes of earnings inequality attributed to ability heterogeneity are
dierent. If we attempt to decompose the earnings inequality into q and " variations, it is
important to identify the metric of ability in wage terms (the value of q). However, since
the aim of this paper is to disentangle the patterns, not the magnitude, of cohort-specic
inequality evolution, it is thought to be a minor issue.
15
Assume that there is no publicly observable correlates of individual ability by which
employers (or market) can infer individual ability, but individual output is measurable
at each time with inclusion of transitory shocks. Since relevant information for ability





does not depend on eort decisions. Thus at each time, each worker
optimizes his/her eort level so as to maximize contemporaneous utility subject to the
information set.



















also denote the initial prior for all agents. We assume that noise variance








3.2 Learning and Eort Variability
As agents do not know their abilities ex ante, they necessarily need to to learn it.
16
14
In other words, ability (productivity) is assumed to be constant. This assumption is necessary for
exclusively focusing on ability learning and resulting eort decisions. However, when we assess earnings
data empirically, it is necessary to incorporate some frameworks for distinguishing ability learning and
productivity increase due to human capital investments inside and outside rms.
15
Of course, if the variances of ability are compared across societies, we need to take into accout the
contribution of  variations.
16
If agents have full information on 
i



















and her most suitable occupation 
i
. In each period, individual receives some signal about her
7







































































































The second term is an adjustment of worker i's perception on , which is the deviation of



































































, measures the speed of adjustment in sequantial eort deci-






































. Note that the variance above
is objective in the sense that the variance is conditional on 
i
(constant), i.e. deterministic


















































































































in later periods. This is dierent from a monotonically increasing relationship, stated in
most of literature. A rise in wage uncertainty may lessen the conditional uctuations of






























There is a non-monotonic relationship between income shock variance and eort variabil-
ity.
We are interested in the lifetime path of eort variations and the dynamics of its cross-
individual variations, which is the time-varying unconditional variance of eort. Since the
population is uniformly distributed over [0; 1], the distinction of sample and population











































































































































if s < t. By the denition of w
i
s














































































































































































































































for all i by assumption.
Q.E.D.
By Theorem 1 and the assumption that prior variance is identical to population variance,































monotonically. The eects of
income-shock variance and ability variance on eort variations are characterized as follows.
10
Proposition 1 Comparative Statics of Eort Inequality
(i) A rise in idiosyncratic income shock variance decreases eort inequality.
(ii) Large ability variance raises eort inequality.











































































The roles of income shock variance and ability variance are distinct: while income
shock variance decreases eort variations, ability variance increases its variations. First,
there are two ways in which an increase in ability variance inuences eort variations: i)
an increase in asymptotic eort variance, and ii) an increase in learning speed (sensitivity
to wage observations). The rst point is a natural consequence of heterogeneities in ability
and wage. The second point results in early emergence of cross-agent eort variations.
Therefore, both contribute to raising eort inequality. Appendix 1 proves that ability het-
erogeneity is not necessary for eort variations, in a special case that agents are identical
with ability, but it is unknown (rational expectations do not hold).
However, a seemingly counter-intuitive point is (i). Since wage uncertainty increases
in income shock variance and eort decisions are responsive to wage realizations, it seems
that an increase in income shock variance raises eort inequality. However, this reasoning
does not incorporate the role of ability learning. An increase in income shock variance
slows down the learning speed, and makes eort decisions less responsive to wage realiza-
tions. This results in smaller cross-agent variations of eort levels.
3.3 An Extension: Autocorrelated Case
11
In this section, the basic framework is extended to a case in which noise in wage
is autocorrelated. I assume that agents know autocorrelation parameter for simplicity.







































). In this case, signal








































is increasing in 
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] as in the i.i.d. case. The response of
eort to a new wage observation is given as
17
The weight can be negative for w
i;t 2




If agents are learning 
i
as well, the weighting scheme 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is also time-varying although it is diÆcult to compute population variance
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is increasing in 
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). Second, as w
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ects the current eort
decision via. autocorrelation parameter 
i
. Next, we see that eort response to wage


















































> 0 for all t. This result, however,
does not necessarily mean that an increase in autocorrelation raises the variance of eort,






becomes smaller as autocorrelation
increases.










. (In the i.i.d. case, it depends on w
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t 1
only). Moreover, the eect
















< 0 (no eect if 
i
= 0). If shocks are positively
(negatively) correlated, a dierencing (averaging) of subsequent wage observations pro-
vides information on 
i
. This condition helps test for the consistency of learning behavior
and wage process.
3.4 Evolution of Labor Earnings Inequality
We go back to the i.i.d. case in this section. An advantage of the i.i.d. case is that it
is possible to derive a closed-form formula of labor earnings variance. Recall that income
13





















result shows the dynamics of labor earnings variance.
























































































































































) was further conditioned on "
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and the last term was derived. By the
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(m) + t(m)] :
14
Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 (i) V ar (y
t
)!  (m) as t! +1. (ii) V ar (y
1
) =  (m).

































































There are three components in labor earnings variance. First, the variance of earnings













. Note that 
2
follows a chi-squared distri-








is the earnings variance at the initial pe-


































is increasing initially but converging to zero asymptotically. The
three components jointly determine the dynamics of labor earnings inequality.
The next result shows its comparative statics and provides empirical predictions on
the evolutionary patterns of labor earnings inequality (see also simulation results in Ya-
mauchi, 1998).
Empirical Predictions:
(i) An increase in ability variance raises labor earnings variance.
(ii) An increase in idiosyncratic income shock variance raises labor earnings variance for














is small (noise variance is relatively large and ability variance is relatively
small).
Proof. (i) Since !
2
t





























































































+  + t

Dividing both sides by t
3





































































for suÆciently large t.

















































































































































































































The statement follows from this condition.
Q.E.D.
4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, I structurally estimate ability and noise variances for Japan and the
U.S. The data used for Japan is Iwamoto estimates of age-specic log income variances
from the Comprehensive Survey of Living Condition of the People on Health and Wealth,
and the data for the U.S. is the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 1990-1997.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of individual labor earnings from PSID and Table
2 shows the numbers of observations by ages in sample.
19
In Table 2, sample sizes for
teenagers and the elderly (above 55) are small. To avoid excessive sampling errors in
earnings variance estimates, I use the age interval of 25-55 for the U.S. Although the
age-specic sample size for Japan does not have the small-size problem, I use the same
age interval for estimation of age-eects on log income variances.
To compare parameter estimates between Japan and the U.S., it is necessary to stan-
dardize variance estimates. As in Section 2, earnings (or income) are log transformed and
their variances are estimated by ages. Variance of log earnings is independent of price
levels and, more importantly, of exchange rate between the countries. Therefore, it is
possible to compare directly age eects of log earnings variance between Japan and the
U.S.
Table 3 compares the estimated age-eects of log earnings (income) variance between
Japan and the U.S. The eects of age 25 are normalized to be zero in Table 3, while the
minimum of the age eects are normalized to be zero in the following structural estimation.
We can observe that levels of the age eects are widely diverged between the countries.
To strengthen our motivation, Figure 4 makes the age eects comparable between the
countries by setting, in addition to the age-25 eects, the age-55 eects as one for both
countries. This normalization enables us to compare the evolutionary patterns of earnings
19
Since, in GSOEP-equivalent version of PSID, labor earnings include the asset income for the self-
employed, some take negative values. For the log transformation and diculty in its interpretation, I
dropped the observations of nagative values.
17
inequality between the two countries. It is found in the gure that, though the patterns
in the 20s are unstable in both countries, the age eects for age 32 or above in the U.S.
are likely larger than those in Japan; the concavity of inequality emergence is stronger in
the U.S. than in Japan.
However, because our model produces the variance of earnings (not of log earnings),
it is necessary to make a transformation from the estimated age-eects of log earnings
to earnings variance from which to estimate structural parameters. It is known that the
distribution of earnings is well approximated by a log normal distribution. Under log-
normality assumption, it is possible to compute age-specic variances of earnings from
the estimated log-earnings age eects (age-specic log-earnings variances). Variance of
earnings is related to the mean and variance of log earnings, as follows:
V ar (y
t
) = exp (2+ V ar (ln y
t
)) fexp (V ar (ln y
t
))  1g ; (8)
where I assume  = 1 hereinafter.
Expressing the higher moments in  (m), (m) and (m) in Eq.(7) in terms of mean
and variance, we can have
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The result is summarized in Table 4. Columns 1-3 show reduced form estimates, from
which to nd a contrast in the patterns of earnings dierential evolution between the
countries. As cohort ages, the rate of inequality emergence increases in Japan and de-
creases in the U.S., although signicance of quadratic term for the U.S. is weak. If age
53 eect is ignored from the U.S, increasing trend and concave shape of age eects are
signicant.






. First, the variances of both ability and
noise are larger in the U.S. than those in Japan. Second, asymptotic variances of earnings
are 31.50 for Japan and 96.47 for the U.S. The asymptotic earnings variance of the U.S.
is about three times larger than that of Japan.







(the key determinant of in-
equality emergence pattern) is, however, larger in Japan (114.70) than in the U.S.(45.50).
Though both ability and noise variances in absolute terms are larger in the U.S. than in
Japan, the noise-ability variance ratio for Japan is nealy 2.5 times larger than that for the
U.S. From our theoretical framework, it would be concluded that the large noise-ability
variance ratio of Japan contributes to the relatively late emergence of earnings inequality
in career in the country (vice versa for the U.S.).
Some cautions are called for in our empirical results. First, I abstract from a possibility
of autocorrelation of wage shocks in the empirical framework. If shocks are positively
correlated more in Japan than the U.S, the noise variance estimate could be biased upward
in the former. This factor might have contributed to a relatively late emergence of earnings
in Japan.
Second, relatively large estimate of noise variance in Japan may generate from in-
exible turnover behavior in the labor markets, or lack of information infrastructure for
20
As discussed in a previous section, we face an identication problem if  is incorporated in the empirical
framework. Due to diÆculty in deriving closed form of earnings variance, it is necessarily to use simulations:
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minimizes the sum of squared errors. Standard deviations of the parameter estimates are derived from




job search in the labor markets. Not only noise in wage-ability linkage in workplace, but
job-search mismatch in nation-wide labor market likely aects the noise variance estimate.
Third, if human capital (on-the-job training) is more rm-specic
in Japan than in the U.S., wage thus endogenously diverges from individual marginal
productivity for young workers. In this case, wage does not play an active role in revealing
workers' ability to themselves. In our framework, it implies that wages contain large mag-
nitude of noise although wage is not distributed around the mean marginal productivity,
but diverges systematically below the productivity (positively autocorrelated). The factor
contributes to a large estimate of noise variance in Japan.
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5 Conclusions
The model of this paper predicts that dierently endowed societies show dierent
evolutionary patterns of labor earnings inequality over time. The inequality emerges
early in lifetime in a heterogeneous society where ability variance is relatively large, and
the inequality likely emerges more intensively late in lifetime in a homogeneous society
where income-shock (i.e. noise) variance is relatively large.
The estimation results show, consistent with the predictions of our model, that Japan
has a relatively larger noise variance (compared to ability variance). In this restricted
sense, the degree in which wage is linked with individual ability (productivity) is small in
Japan. This makes the emergence of earnings inequality later in lifetime in the country.
Second, both ability and noise variances are larger in the U.S. than in Japan. This
results in an asymptotically large earnings variance in the U.S, three times as large as
that for Japan. It is possible to conclude that cross-agent ability heterogeneity as well as
risks in pay determination are larger in the U.S.
However, the analysis ignores other factors which possibly generate time-varying earn-
ings inequality. These include changes in the returns on schooling and skills, dierences
in on-the-job productivity increase, dierences in promotion speeds across individuals,
and others. Of course, although incorporating these time-varying factors of individual
productivity change enriches as well as complicates our framework, it is however beyond
the scope of this paper.
21
Human capital formation is not incorporated in the model, however. I therefore cannot identify the
dierent roles of ability-learning eect and of human-capital accumulation eect in the current framework.
But I just mention the eect of the existence of specic human capital on workers' ability-learning.
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